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Horizontal Educational Inequalities and Civil Conflict: The Nexus of Ethnicity,
Inequality, and Violent Conflict
Abstract
Development economists have long questioned the relationship between civil conflict, inequality, and
ethnic heterogeneity. While most quantitative literature has focused on inequality between individuals,
this study analyzes the relationship of horizontal inequality – between groups of individuals sharing a
common identity – and propensity for the onset of civil conflict, focusing on horizontal educational
inequality (HEI). Findings from Demographic and Health Survey data for 44 countries from 1986 to 2005
show that measures of both female and male HEI are marginally or not significant in predicting civil
conflict but strongly significant in predicting ethnic civil conflict.
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1. Introduction
“Simple inequality between rich and poor is not enough to cause violent conflict.
What is highly explosive is […] ‘horizontal’ inequality: when power and
resources are unequally distributed between groups that are also differentiated in
other ways – for instance by race, religion or language.”
- Kofi Annan, 1999
Over the past half-century, civil conflict has been prevalent in a majority
of the world’s developing countries. Civil conflicts, measured by a threshold of
25 battle-related deaths per year, have occurred in over half of all countries since
1960. Civil wars, measured by a threshold of 1000 battle-related deaths per year,
have occurred in a third. Certain regions of the world, such as sub-Saharan
Africa, have consistently been embroiled in intrastate conflicts; at one point
during the mid-1990s, a third of sub-Saharan African countries were involved in
civil conflict at the same time (Blattman & Miguel, 2008). Beyond its growing
prevalence, civil conflict is also linked to devastating social and economic
impacts. For these reasons, there is strong consensus among economists on the
need to increase our understanding of the causes of civil conflict, as can be seen in
the sharp rise in conflict research since the 1990s (Dixon, 2009).
Yet among the research and resulting publications, there is still little
consensus on many of the most commonly proposed indicators of conflict. In an
aggregation of results from 46 quantitative studies on civil conflict, Dixon (2009)
found clear consensus on no more than seven of over 200 tested variables, and
even among those seven, he found contention over definition and measurement.
Two of the most commonly included indicators are measures of inequality and
ethnic heterogeneity. However, while theoretically supported by much of the
qualitative literature, measures of both inequality and ethnic heterogeneity were
found to be insignificant in two of the most prominent quantitative analyses of
civil war onset published in the last decade – studies by Fearon & Laitin (2003)
and Collier & Hoeffler (2004).
In reaction to these results, scholars are now focusing on measures of
inequality and ethnic division that better capture the group aspect of conflict
(Østby, 2008). As stated by Kofi Annan in a 1999 address to the World Bank,
inequality between groups is likely to lead to conflict, not simply inequality
between individuals. Furthermore, inequality that coincides with ethnic divides
may be particularly dangerous (Annan, 1999; Stewart, 2000; Østby, 2008). This
type of inequality – formed between groups sharing a common identity – has been
referred to as “horizontal inequality” in recent literature (Stewart, 2000; Østby,
2008). Different from “vertical inequality” that captures differences between
individuals (often measured by Gini coefficients), horizontal inequality (HI)
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captures aspects of both group and socio-economic polarization. Thus, a measure
of HI may better reflect the multidimensional nature of inequity that leads to
conflict.
Through extensive case study work, Stewart has added significantly to the
literature on HI by examining the relationship between inequality and conflict in
developing countries; however, due to the micro-level nature of her work, she
typically selects on the dependent or independent variables, limiting the broader
application of her results (Stewart, 2000; 2001; Stewart, Brown, & Mancini,
2005). For this reason, Østby has sought to conduct the first large-N analyses of
HI in developing countries, using survey data from Demographic and Health
Surveys (DHS) to build measures of HI for socio-economic factors (Østby, 2005;
2006; 2008; Østby, Nordås, & Rød, 2006).
This paper builds upon Østby’s work examining HIs in education between
ethnic groups in developing countries (Østby, 2008). While Østby found
horizontal educational inequality (in this paper referred to as HEI) to be
marginally significant in predicting the onset of civil conflict, my analysis seeks
to strengthen or refute her results by extending her methodology to a broader
sample of countries and years and to data on both females and males. 1
Furthermore, I will broaden my independent variable to include measures of both
civil conflict and ethnic civil conflict at two different violence thresholds. Much
of the literature on ethnicity and violence indicates that the causes of ethnic and
non-ethnic conflicts may be significantly different, and I will examine if this
holds true for HEI across my sample countries and years (Sambanis, 2001).
The structure of my paper is as follows: I first discuss the literature on
ethnic heterogeneity and inequality in relation to civil conflict, focusing on the
differences between vertical inequality, polarization, and horizontal inequality. I
then present a theoretical framework for studying horizontal educational
inequality, followed by my hypotheses and research design. After discussion of
variable selection and my model, I present the results of my analysis. My main
findings are that while female and male HEI are marginally significant or not
significant in predicting civil conflict across both violence thresholds (in line with
Østby’s results), both female and male HEI are strongly significant in predicting
the onset of ethnic civil conflict, and female HEI is significant in predicting ethnic
civil war. Furthermore, male HEI interacts with conflict in different ways than
female HEI. I end my paper with a discussion of the limitations and further
extensions of my study and some concluding remarks.

1

For reasons discussed in the following section, Østby restricts her analysis to females.
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2. Literature Review
Over the past decade, two of the most prominent and comprehensive
studies of civil conflict onset have been published by economists seeking to
establish the rationale behind group mobilization. Fearon & Laitin (2003) and
Collier & Hoeffler (2004) both drew on theory that conceives the decision to
engage in civil conflict as an expected utility calculation, weighing the expected
gains from rebellion, given a set of grievances, with the expected losses, including
the opportunity cost of forgone production. 2 Theories regarding income and asset
inequality and ethnic heterogeneity played into both analyses.
Collier & Hoeffler (2004) modeled the demand for rebel labor as a
function of collective grievances – including income inequality – and the supply
of rebel labor as a function of the economic costs and benefits of rebellion –
including social fractionalization. Income inequality was measured by a Gini
coefficient and by the ratio of the top-to-bottom quintiles of income, and asset
inequality was measured by the Gini coefficient of land ownership. Despite their
hypothesis that the poor may rebel to induce wealth redistribution or that the rich
may rebel to further secure their economic status, the measures of inequality were
found to be insignificant. Collier & Hoeffler also hypothesized that rebel armies
would prefer to recruit along ethnic lines, since ethnic diversity within groups
may cause frictions; thus, a society with a high degree of ethnic fractionalization
would limit rebels to small recruitment pools, perhaps increasing the costs and
decreasing the propensity of conflict. Conversely, they hypothesized that a
society that is ethnically polarized, or divided into a few larger groups, would
have a higher risk of conflict, as there would be a higher possibility of disputes
developing between distinct ethnic groups. They measured ethnic diversity using
an index of ethno-linguistic fractionalization 3 and adopted a measure of ethnic
polarization 4 from Esteban & Ray. However, once again, they found both
measures to be insignificant in their models.
Fearon & Laitin (2003) also included income inequality in their analyses
to test for possible grievances between groups, but like Collier & Hoeffler (2004),
they found a measure of the Gini coefficient for income inequality to be
insignificant. Concerning ethnicity, however, they took an alternative approach
and hypothesized that there may be a negative relationship between the level of
2

An elaboration of this theory in relation to my study can be found in the subsequent section on
the theoretical framework for group mobilization (2.3).
3
Interpreted as the probability that two randomly selected people within a country will be from
different ethnic groups.
4
Measures of fractionalization increase when the number of ethnic groups in a society increases;
measures of polarization increase when there are few (equally) large ethnic groups exhibiting
within-group similarities.
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ethnic diversity and propensity for civil conflict, as more diversity provides
grounds for more disputes. They also tested for a possible inverted U-shaped
relationship, with increased risk for either very high or very low levels of
fractionalization. However, they found these measures of ethnic fractionalization
to be insignificant in their models. Theorizing that ethnic diversity may lead
specifically to ethnic conflict, Fearon & Laitin reran their analyses with ethnic
conflict as the independent variable.
However, despite the theoretical
relationship, they found no significant empirical relationship between ethnic
fractionalization and ethnic civil conflict. 5
2.1 Issues with the Inequality–Conflict Literature
While the findings of Collier & Hoeffler (2004) and Fearon & Laitin
(2003) seem to suggest that there exists no significant relationship between
inequality, ethnicity, and civil conflict, I argue that their conclusions may be
misleading, as both studies failed to account for the multidimensional aspect of
conflict. Both studies examined grievances and opportunities for conflict, but
they only looked at one dimension of each. Measures of income or asset
inequality calculate relative deprivation between individuals in a country, referred
to as “vertical inequality.” Thus, these measures fail to incorporate the fact that
rebellions are staged by groups, not individuals, and that groups need a common
identity behind which to unite. Measures of ethnic heterogeneity or polarization,
on the other hand, provide evidence of unified groups that could possibly engage
in conflict, but they fail to provide any compelling reason for conflict. In fact,
many countries are characterized by high levels of ethnic diversity but experience
no significant conflict, such as Tanzania and Ghana, and it may be due to the lack
of socio-economic inequalities (Østby, 2008).
Due to this disconnect in the literature on inequality and conflict, scholars
have more recently turned to measures that capture the multidimensional aspect of
conflict – the need for clearly identified groups (e.g. high ethnic polarization) and
also for inter-group grievances (e.g. inequality). Inequalities that form between
culturally formed groups have become known as “horizontal inequalities” (HIs).
The most comprehensive work on HIs comes from extensive case studies by
Stewart across developing countries (Stewart, 2000; 2001; Stewart, Brown, &
Mancini, 2005). However, while contributing substantially to our understanding
of HIs on a micro-level, her work is restricted to case studies and she typically
selects on the dependent or independent variables, looking at countries where HIs
5

It should be noted that while Collier & Hoeffler and Fearon & Laitin have published the most
prominent studies on civil conflict onset, their results concerning inequality and ethnic
heterogeneity have been supported throughout much of the conflict literature (Dixon, 2009;
Sambanis, 2002; Østby, 2008).
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have been found to lead to conflict. This limits the application of her work to a
broader range of countries or a more systematic approach.
Another weakness of the inequality-conflict literature is that most studies,
including the influential works of Collier & Hoeffler (2004) and Fearon & Laitin
(2003), look only at aspects of economic inequality. While many economic
factors have been shown to play a significant role in predicting civil conflict,
income and asset inequality are not the only factors that may lead to grievances or
that signal potential costs and benefits of rebellion. Stewart’s work has covered
many aspects of inequality other than income, such as political and social welfare
factors (Stewart, 2002). One aspect of social welfare that may be a particularly
important factor in terms of group grievances is education, because inequality in
education is more likely to be the result of visible, systematic discrimination than
income or even asset inequality is. In many documented cases, the ruling power
in a country has used state resources to limit educational access to minorities,
such as in South Africa and Sri Lanka (Gurr, 2000; Murshed & Gates, 2005;
Stewart, 2002). Inequality stemming from such blatantly discriminatory actions
may provide an impetus for group mobilization, and it is this aspect of inequality
that I hope to capture in my study.
2.2 Horizontal Educational Inequality
The first large-N studies of horizontal inequality done in relation to
conflict have been conducted by Østby, and these analyses include both economic
and social factors of HI (Østby, 2005; 2006; 2008; Østby, Nordås, & Rød, 2006).
While measures of economic HI for income and asset distribution were
consistently found to be insignificant in her work, Østby found some support for a
measure of social HI, proxied by years of schooling. In my study, I will refer to
this measure as horizontal educational inequality (HEI). To test for its
significance, Østby created an index of HEI from survey data and regressed it on
civil conflict onset, controlling for three commonly included variables in the
conflict literature – GDP per capita, population, and conflict history. She found
HEI to be significant at the 10% level for predicting the onset of civil conflict, a
result she claimed to be noteworthy given the small sample size and nonsignificance of the other variables included in the model (Østby, 2008).
However, there are a few discrepancies in Østby’s theory that may
undermine her results. First, Østby creates her indicators for HI based solely on
data gathered from females, but she does not acknowledge this in her work. She
most likely focuses on females because of the nature of Demographic and Health
Surveys (DHS), the source for her explanatory HI variables, which focus on
females and households rather than males. However, I would expect female and
male HEI to interact differently with conflict, perhaps at least with different
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magnitudes, so I believe the assumption that they perform the same may be
misleading. Another critique is that Østby does not examine ethnic conflict as an
independent variable in her models, despite the inherent definition of HI as
promoting group mobilization along ethnic lines. Much of the conflict literature
on ethnic mobilization suggests decreased transaction costs and increased intragroup trust when groups act along ethnic lines, decreasing the costs and therefore
increasing the likelihood of conflict (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Sambanis, 2001;
Østby, 2008). I would expect a stronger relationship between HEI and ethnic
civil conflict than I would between HEI and overall civil conflict. Finally, Østby
is limited in her analysis by the availability of DHS surveys. Yet since the time of
her study, several more DHS surveys on a wider range of countries have become
available. Testing her methodology on a more representative sample would serve
as a desirable robustness check to her analysis.
2.3 Theoretical Framework for Group Mobilization
In developing a theoretical framework for my own study of HEI and the
propensity for civil conflict, I adopt the intuition behind a model by Esteban &
Ray (2008) which seeks to explain the behavior of participants in civil conflict. 6
Esteban & Ray describe conflict as a rent-seeking game, where in deciding
whether to rebel, participants weigh the expected payoffs of participating in
conflict against the payoffs of accepting the status quo distribution of a public
good. For my study, I will assume that the public good at stake is education
(proxied by years of schooling) and that there are two groups per country vying
for access.
To measure the expected payoffs of conflict, Esteban & Ray assume that
each individual in a group that decides to rebel incurs some cost of resources used
in rebellion, measured by c(ri), where i = 1, 2 indicates membership in one of the
two groups. Each individual that participates in rebellion also gains some
expected benefit in increased access to education. This is measured by the
difference in utility between a preferred educational outcome and the current
status quo outcome, bi, multiplied by the probability of attaining the preferred
outcome, pi. 7 The expected utility of an individual who rebels is thus given by
ui = pibi – c(ri).

(1)

6

The model presented in the 2008 paper is one application of a broader model developed earlier
(Esteban & Ray, 1999). However, for the purposes of this paper, the model presented in the 2008
paper includes all relative aspects for examining the distribution of a public good between two
distinct groups.
7
In Esteban & Ray (2008), this probability is defined as a function of the group size, but it could
also be seen as a measure of wealth, power, motivation, etc.
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The expected utility for participating in conflict given in (1) is then
compared with the utility derived from retaining the status quo distribution of
education. Let this status quo utility be measured by γi for each individual in a
group. By assuming rationality in maximizing utility, it can be seen that members
of a group will rebel if and only if
ui

γi for i = 1, 2.

(2)

Thus, the decision to rebel is a function of the expected gains from rebellion, the
probability of staging a successful rebellion, the cost of staging a rebellion, and
the level of satisfaction with the status quo distribution. If the expected gains in
utility from fighting never outweigh the utility derived from the status quo, then
an equilibrium will be reached at which both groups are at peace.
The simple intuition used to derive (2) provides a basis for predicting the
relationship between HEIs and the propensity for civil conflict. Since for conflict
to take place, ui γi must occur for one of the groups, I would expect a higher
propensity for conflict when γi is low for one of the groups than when γi is high,
ceteris paribus. Since γi is the utility derived from the status quo distribution of
education in a country, this is likely to be low for one group when there are large
disparities in years of schooling between the two groups. As noted in the earlier
discussion of horizontal inequalities, this disparity is captured by a measure of
HEI, thus leading to my first hypothesis:
H1: The higher the level of HEI in a country, the higher the risk of civil conflict.
Since HEI is a measure of inequality between ethnic groups, I would also
expect a strong relationship between the level of HEI in a country and the risk of
ethnic civil conflict. Ethnic conflict is typically defined as civil conflict in which
armed organizations both explicitly pursue ethno-nationalist aims and also recruit
fighters and forge alliances along ethnic lines. Scholars have theorized that
groups with shared identities have lower costs of rebellion, since they can more
easily recruit from within the identity group, they are less burdened by collective
action problems due to suspicions between group members, and they often have
political or cultural symbols and ideals to rally behind (Cederman, Wimmer, &
Min, 2010; Fearon, 2004; Gurr, 2000; Sambanis, 2001). I theorize that this
decrease in costs for ethnic mobilization, measured in (2) by a drop in c(ri), leads
to an increase in the expected utility from rebellion, measured by ui, thus leading
to an increase in the likelihood that ui
γi, inducing an ethnic group into
rebellion. This theory provides me with my second hypothesis:
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H2: The higher the level of HEI in a country, the higher the risk of ethnic civil
conflict.
A final application of (2) in my study is that a group that places a higher
value on education would experience a higher value of bi, since it takes into
account the utility derived from any given level of education. Since males are the
primary income earners in many developing countries, they stand to gain more
economically from an increase in education than do females. This may suggest
that given the same level of HEI for males and females, males may perceive more
value in the potential to increase their access to education. A higher level of bi in
(2) would correspond with a higher level of ui, again increasing the likelihood of
rebellion. This provides me with my third hypothesis regarding gender
differences within measures of HEI:
H3: Given equal levels of HEI, there will be a higher risk for civil conflict and/or
ethnic civil conflict associated with male HEI than with female HEI.
This hypothesis may gain additional support from conclusions drawn by
Collier & Hoeffler (2004) that males with low levels of secondary education are
more likely to join rebellions, as their opportunity cost of fighting is much lower.
This would play into the utility maximizing function for males as a lower c(ri),
leading to a higher ui, but would not play into the function for females, as they
typically do not supply rebel labor. This difference may further increase the
likelihood of my third hypothesis holding true.
3. Data & Methodology
This study seeks to test the hypotheses presented above through an
empirical analysis of all countries in which at least one Demographic and Health
Survey was conducted over the period 1986 to 2005. DHS surveys are part of an
ongoing research project by the US Agency for International Development
(USAID) and are intended to collect reliable information on the welfare of women
and households in developing countries. To be qualified for my analysis, the
surveys needed to include data on ethnicity and years of schooling attained for
each participant. As some surveys excluded data on ethnicity due to the
sensitivity of ethnicity information in many developing countries, the scope of my
study was limited to 93 surveys on 44 countries for females and 57 surveys on 32
countries for males. The number of valid surveys is fewer for males because
DHS data focuses primarily on females; however, many countries have begun to
collect information on males more consistently in recent years, allowing for the
inclusion of male indicators in my study.
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While relying on DHS surveys limits the scope of my study, it also allows
for the creation of highly reliable group-level indicators of horizontal inequalities,
as done by Østby in several studies (Østby, 2006; 2008; Østby, Nordås, & Rød,
2006). DHS surveys are characterized by large sample sizes, random sampling,
and standardized questionnaires, leading to the creation of reliable indicators
across countries and across time. Any validity problems are also minimized by
the simplicity of the questions used for this study, since questions on ethnicity and
years of schooling should require straightforward answers. The list of all DHS
surveys and countries used in this study can be found in Appendix A.
Furthermore, a map of the geographic distribution of countries can be found in
Appendix B.
3.1 Dependent Variables: Civil and Ethnic Civil Conflict
To test my hypotheses, I will employ four separate variables of civil
conflict onset in my analysis – civil conflict, civil war, ethnic civil conflict, and
ethnic civil war. The data come from the Ethnic Armed Conflict dataset compiled
by Cederman, Min, & Wimmer and are based on the UCDP/PRIO Armed
Conflicts Data Set (ACD), Version 3-2005b (Gleditsch et at. 2002). Each
variable is binary and takes the value of 1 for years in which a conflict begins and
0 otherwise. Civil conflict is defined as any armed and organized confrontation
between government troops and rebel organizations or between army factions that
reaches an annual threshold of 25 battle-related deaths. Civil war is similarly
defined, but with an annual threshold of 1000 battle-related deaths. Ethnic civil
conflict is defined as civil conflict in which armed organizations both explicitly
pursue ethno-nationalist aims and interests and also recruit fighters and forge
alliances along ethnic lines. Ethnic civil conflict refers to an annual threshold of
25 battle-related deaths, whereas ethnic civil war is similarly defined but refers to
an annual threshold of 1000 battle-related deaths. It should be noted that by these
definitions, civil conflict/ethnic civil conflict include those conflicts also identified
as wars, and civil conflict/civil war include those conflicts also identified as
ethnic. The frequency of each type of conflict in my dataset can be seen in Table
1 below.
TABLE 1: Frequency of conflict onset in the data (female and male data sets)
Identity
FEMALE
Ethnic and Non-ethnic

Ethnic only

Civil Conflict

39

28

Civil War

20

13

Intensity
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Identity
MALE
Ethnic and Non-ethnic

Ethnic only

Civil Conflict

28

22

Civil War

16

12

Intensity

3.2 Independent Variable: Horizontal Educational Inequality
My measure of horizontal educational inequality is adopted from Østby
(2008) and is based on information from DHS survey data on ethnic affinity and
years of schooling. Following the approach of Brockerhoff & Hewett (2000) that
was applied by Østby, I focus on the two largest ethnic groups in each country. In
doing so, I assume that the level of inequality between the two largest ethnic
groups within a country is most important in predicting civil conflict. My
indicator of HEI is generated using two variables from the DHS surveys for
females/males: v131/mv131 (ethnicity) and v133/mv133 (total years of education
completed). In order to compare HEIs across countries, a measure is needed that
reflects levels of inequality on a standardized scale. To do so, Østby uses the
following formula:
𝐸
HEI = 1 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝 �− �𝑙𝑛 � 1�𝐸 ���
2

(3)

where E1 is the average educational attainment in years of schooling for the first
ethnic group and E2 is the average educational attainment for the second ethnic
group. This measure is scaled from 0 to 1, with 0 indicating perfect equality in
educational attainment (both groups have same average years of schooling) and 1
indicating that one group has all of the educational attainment (measured in years
of schooling) and the other group has none. In my dataset, the measure of female
HEI ranges from .000 to .800 and the measure of male HEI ranges from .014 to
.749 (the highest actual level of observed inequality).
The values calculated for HEI are then interpolated between survey years
and extrapolated to cover the time span of the study, 1986-2005. Simple linear
interpolation is used between survey years. Extrapolation is done by adopting the
value of HEI from the survey closest in time for previous and subsequent years
within the time period. For countries with only one survey, the value of HEI for
that survey is used for all years in order to increase the sample size of the study.
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While this may weaken the validity of my independent variable, it is important to
note that inequality often changes slowly over time, and thus the accuracy of the
measure still remains reasonably strong (Østby, 2006). Another important
limitation of my data is that the sample suffers from potential selection bias. DHS
surveys are not conducted in countries that are heavily war-ridden, and for some
countries that do host DHS surveys, ethnicity data is censored due to its highly
sensitive nature. It should be noted, however, that these selection biases tend to
omit countries that potentially would further strengthen my hypotheses, and thus
their omission puts a possible downward bias on the results (Oswald, 2010;
Østby, 2008).
3.3 Control Variables
I control for other robustly significant variables in the civil conflict
literature, focusing on those included in Fearon & Laitin’s (2003) model of civil
conflict onset. As noted throughout the civil conflict literature, Fearon & Laitin
have employed perhaps the most comprehensive and well-supported model of
conflict onset to this date, and their approach has been replicated in several other
studies of civil conflict initiation (Blattman & Miguel, 2008; Dixon, 2009;
Sambanis, 2001; 2002; Thyne, 2006). As noted by Dixon (2009), all seven of the
independent variables found by Fearon & Laitin to be significant have been well
supported in subsequent literature. Thus, I will include these controls in my
analysis. Other authors have shied from including more than three or four control
variables in their analyses due to concerns over multicollinearity; however, as can
be seen by the covariance table in Appendix C, collinearity does not seem to be a
considerable issue for my data (Oswald, 2010; Østby, 2008). Furthermore,
rerunning the models with fewer control variables was found to not significantly
alter the main results. To deal with possible problems of endogeneity in my
models, all time variate control variables listed below are lagged by one year,
following the methodology of Fearon & Laitin (2003) and others.
Three of the most commonly controlled for factors in models of civil
conflict onset are economic development, population size, and conflict history.
The first, economic development, is proxied by GDP per capita and is given in
constant 2000 US Dollars. The negative effect of GDP per capita on propensity
for civil conflict is one of the most widely supported relationships in the literature.
The second control variable, log transformed population size, is theorized to have
a positive relationship with civil conflict onset, as a large population makes it
easier for rebels to evade notice and detainment by the central authorities and also
provides a larger recruitment base. Thirdly, I control for the number of years
since the previous conflict, peace years, at the given violence threshold – so,
years since the previous conflict for the conflict variables and years since the
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previous war for the war variables. This aims to control for any temporal
dependence within the data. 8
Factors concerning the political environment in a country often are
associated with the risk of civil conflict breakout. It is theorized that democracy
should exhibit a negative relationship with civil conflict, since democracies
provide a political environment in which all citizens have some political power,
reducing discrimination and repression of certain groups. A dummy variable for
democracy is thus included, measured by a score of +6 or higher on the Polity IV
scale. It is also hypothesized that autocracies may be associated with less civil
conflict, since an authoritative state is well equipped to suppress rebellion. To
test this line of thinking, a control for political systems that are neither democratic
nor autocratic, known as anocracies, is included. Anocracy should thus exhibit a
positive relationship with civil conflict, and it is coded as a dummy variable for
political systems that lie between -6 and +6 on the Polity IV scale. A third control
is included for political environments that are unstable, since recent changes in
the central government may indicate disorganization and potential to be
overthrown by rebels. Thus, a dummy variable for regime change is included that
indicates a movement along the Polity IV scale of 3 or more points over the prior
three years. Finally, it is hypothesized that the government of a new state may be
weak within the first few years of formation, as it has not yet settled into a stable
structure and may still have new or untested military operations. Since this may
leave the government vulnerable to rebellion, a dummy variable for new state is
included, coded for countries in the first two years of existence.
Lastly, three controls related to geography and natural resources are
included. Countries that depend heavily on oil exports tend to have weaker
centralized governments, as rulers can depend on oil rents and do not require
elaborate bureaucratic systems to raise tax revenues. Furthermore, capturing oil
revenues may serve as an incentive to gain control of the state. 9 Thus, oil
production per capita, as measured by the annual oil production in metric tons
divided by the population, is included in my analysis. Similar to the rationale for
a large population, rough terrain should favor rebellion as it makes it easier for
rebels to evade notice and capture from the central government. I follow Fearon
& Laitin (2003) by controlling for the percent of a country covered in
mountainous terrain, according to the coding of geographer A. J. Gerard. Finally,
8

I also ran my analyses with cubic splines to further control for temporal dependence, following
the methodology of Østby (2008) and others; however, inclusion of the splines did not
significantly alter my findings, so I excluded them from the results shown in this paper. For an
explanation of the rationale for cubic splines, see Beck, Katz, & Tucker (1998).
9
An alternative explanation is provided by Wimmer & Min (2006), who hypothesize that states
that depend on oil rents instead of a constituent tax base may develop higher degrees of
clientelism, especially along ethnic lines. This ethnic exclusion may provide the impetus for
mobilization against the state, leading to higher prevalence of civil conflict.
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it is predicted that a country that includes some territories separated from the
state’s center by water or distance (for example, East Pakistan (now Bangladesh)
from West Pakistan or an island nation such as the Philippines) may be at higher
risk for rebellion, as the government may not be able to retain control over distant
or separate territories. To control for this, a dummy for noncontiguous state is
included.
3.4 Empirical Model
Due to the binary nature of my dependent variables, I employ a logistic
regression model to test my hypotheses. This model predicts the odds of civil
conflict onset by fitting data to a logistic curve. Following the methodology of
Østby and others, I use country-clustered standard errors, which relaxes the
assumption of completely independent observations from the same countries over
time (Sambanis, 2001; Østby, 2008). It should be noted however, that running the
regressions using regular robust standard errors instead of robust clustered
standard errors did not significantly alter my results. Analyses were performed
using STATA, version 11.1. Descriptive statistics for each variable can be found
in Appendix D.
4. Results
As noted previously, I employ logistic regression models to test my
hypothesized relationships between HEI and civil conflict. I start by presenting
the results of my analysis of female HEI, measured for 44 countries from 1986 to
2005. To test my first hypothesis – that higher levels of HEI are associated with a
higher propensity for civil conflict – I regress the onset of civil conflict and civil
war on female HEI and my control variables. The results of these regressions can
be seen in Model 1 and Model 2 presented in Table 2 below.
In the first model, I find female HEI to be significant and positively
correlated with increased propensity for civil conflict onset. This finding supports
the analysis done by Østby (2008) on a smaller set of countries and years, in
which she found HEI to be positive and significantly related to conflict at the 10%
level. The marginal effect of HEI is also strong, as a 0.1 increase in the value of
HEI (on a 0 to 1 scale) is associated with a 26% increase in the odds of civil
conflict onset. This means that the odds of civil conflict onset for the maximum
level of observed HEI in this dataset are 3.28 times higher than the odds of
conflict for the average level of HEI. In my model of civil war initiation (Model
2), female HEI is not found to be significant. This may suggest that a high level
of HEI for females may mobilize groups to engage in minor conflicts, but it is not
enough to justify large-scale conflicts that are much more costly.
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TABLE 2: Conflict Onset in 44 Developing Countries, 1986 – 2005
Model 1
Civil Conflict
Female HEI
GDP per capita†
Population (ln)†
Peace years (Civil conflict)
Peace years (Civil war)

2.303**
(0.916)
-0.241
(0.193)
0.006
(0.159)
0.015
(0.012)

Model 2
Civil War
1.990
(1.304)
-0.260
(0.255)
0.126
(0.217)

Model 3
Ethnic
Civil Conflict
4.466***
(0.960)
-0.950***
(0.362)
-0.263
(0.187)
0.030*
(0.016)

-0.012
(0.013)
Democracy†
-1.025
-0.846*
-0.684
(0.627)
(0.491)
(0.817)
Anocracy†
-0.027
0.027
-0.020
(0.430)
(0.669)
(0.532)
New state
3.509***
3.031***
6.950***
(1.149)
(0.995)
(1.792)
Regime change
-0.421
0.049
-0.268
(0.323)
(0.576)
(0.407)
Oil production per capita†
0.165
0.231
0.690***
(0.155)
(0.202)
(0.216)
Mountainous terrain (ln)
-0.008
0.178
-0.069
(0.096)
(0.165)
(0.183)
Noncontiguous state
2.118***
1.852**
4.247***
(0.719)
(0.912)
(0.846)
Constant
-3.474
-5.425***
-1.681
(1.258)
(1.901)
(1.548)
N Observations
834
834
834
N Conflict onsets
39
20
28
Logit estimates with robust country-clustered standard errors in parentheses.
*p < 0.10; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01
†
Lagged one year

Model 4
Ethnic
Civil War
3.848**
(1.577)
-1.235***
(0.382)
0.003
(0.296)

0.004
(0.018)
-1.166**
(0.569)
-0.337
(0.773)
7.867***
(1.272)
0.236
(0.789)
0.884***
(0.183)
0.138
(0.284)
4.213***
(1.009)
-4.585
(3.059)
834
13

Turning to ethnic conflict, Model 3 from Table 2 shows that female HEI is
strongly associated with the onset of ethnic conflict and is significant at the 1%
level. It is also significant in magnitude, as an increase in the level of HEI of 0.1
(on a 0 to 1 scale) is associated with a 56% increase in the odds of ethnic conflict
initiation. This means that the odds of ethnic conflict onset at the highest
observed level of female HEI are 10 times the odds of conflict onset at the mean
value of HEI. This result lends support to my second hypothesis that high levels
of HEI affect propensity for ethnic conflict at a higher magnitude than they affect
civil conflict. Furthermore, this relationship holds for higher thresholds of
violence. Female HEI significantly predicts the onset of ethnic civil war, whereas
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it was not found to be significant in the model of overall civil war. The percent
change in odds associated with an increase in female HEI is less for ethnic civil
war than for ethnic civil conflict but is still greater than for overall civil conflict –
an increase of 0.1 is associated with a 47% increase in the odds of ethnic civil war
onset. This translates into the odds of onset at the highest level of observed
female HEI being 7.27 times the odds of onset at the average level of HEI.
In the four models presented in Table 2, only new state and noncontiguous
state are consistently significant in predicting the onset of conflict, and they both
contribute heavily in magnitude to the odds of conflict onset. For countries in my
dataset, being in the first two years of existence increases the odds of civil conflict
and civil war onset by 33 and 20 times, respectively, and increases the odds of
ethnic civil conflict and ethnic civil war by 1043 and 2611 times, respectively.
Being a noncontiguous state increases the odds of civil conflict and civil war
onset by 8.3 and 6.4 times, respectively, and increases the odds of ethnic civil
conflict and ethnic civil war by 70 and 68 times, respectively. The extreme nature
of these results is likely due to the small size of my dataset, which includes a
higher percentage of noncontiguous countries and newly formed countries than a
more representative sample; however, the results still signal a strong relationship
that has been supported both theoretically and empirically in conflict literature.
GDP per capita and oil production per capita are found to be significant
in the models of ethnic conflict and war but not in those for overall conflict and
war. A one-dollar increase in per capita GDP is associated with 61.3% decrease
in the odds of ethnic civil conflict onset and a 70.9% decrease in the odds of
ethnic civil war onset. This supports much of the literature on civil conflict that
predicts a decrease in conflict with higher levels of economic development. High
levels of oil production, theorized to increase the risk of conflict due to
dependence on oil rents, is found to increase the odds of ethnic civil conflict by
99% per extra metric ton of oil per capita, and increase the odds of ethnic civil
war by 142% for the same increment.
Analyzing the same models, but using male HEI and 32 countries from
1986 to 2005, I am able to compare the differences between female and male HEI
and their relationship with civil conflict onset. Models 5 and 6 in Table 3 again
test my first hypothesis, and similar to the results from the female HEI data, it can
be seen that male HEI is marginally significant in predicting the onset of civil
conflict and not significant in predicting civil war. This shows some support that
male and female measures of HEI seem to exhibit parallel effects on civil conflict.
The economic significance of male HEI in Model 5 is also very similar to that for
female HEI in Model 1; an increase of 0.1 in the value of HEI (on a 0 to 1 scale)
is associated with a 25% increase in the odds of civil conflict onset, whereas it
was a 26% increase for female HEI. This begins to draw into question my third
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hypothesis, which posits that male HEI will be higher in magnitude than female
HEI in predicting civil conflict onset.
TABLE 3: Conflict Onset in 32 Developing Countries, 1986 – 2005
Model 5
Civil Conflict
Male HEI
GDP per capita†
Population (ln)†
Peace years (Civil conflict)
Peace years (Civil war)
Democracy†

2.238*
(1.312)
-0.929**
(0.463)
-0.167
(0.275)
0.032**
(0.475)

Model 6
Civil War
0.812
(1.644)
-0.687
(0.430)
-0.230
(0.435)

Model 7
Ethnic
Civil Conflict
4.276***
(1.189)
-1.556***
(0.463)
-0.340
(0.258)
0.340**
(0.014)

-0.004
(0.017)

-2.080
-1.903
--(1.640)
(2.245)
Anocracy†
0.316
0.597
0.212
(0.475)
(0.851)
(0.529)
New state
7.434***
5.053***
10.325***
(1.888)
(1.127)
(2.032)
Regime change
-0.314
0.527
-0.183
(0.375)
(0.702)
(0.458)
Oil production per capita†
0.467*
0.544*
0.837***
(0.254)
(0.301)
(0.258)
Mountainous terrain (ln)
0.147
0.588**
0.209
(0.120)
(0.255)
(0.176)
Noncontiguous state
3.182***
1.803***
4.105***
(0.772)
(0.677)
(1.013)
Constant
-1.760
-2.988
-0.603
(2.415)
(3.154)
(2.642)
N Observations
609
609
609
N Conflict onsets
28
12
22
Logit estimates with robust country-clustered standard errors in parentheses.
*p < 0.10; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01
†
Lagged one year
--- Democracy removed from civil war models due to perfect collinearity

Model 8
Ethnic
Civil War
2.744
(1.840)
-1.123***
(0.297)
-0.302
(0.022)

0.208
(0.913)
--0.208
(0.913)
7.732***
(1.363)
0.955
(0.816)
0.952***
(0.182)
0.746**
(0.319)
2.032***
(0.637)
-3.321
(3.907)
609
8

To further test my second hypothesis, I model the relationship between
male HEI and my controls and ethnic civil conflict and ethnic civil war. Once
again, ethnic civil conflict is significantly linked with the measure of HEI, this
time being for males. However, the magnitude of the significance is smaller in
Model 7 than it was for the parallel model of female HEI. A 0.1 increase in the
value of male HEI is associated with a 53% increase in the odds of ethnic civil
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conflict onset (compared to a 56% increase for female HEI). This means that the
odds of ethnic civil conflict onset for the maximum level of observed male HEI in
this dataset are 8.48 times higher than the odds of conflict for the average level of
male HEI. Contrary to my findings for female HEI, however, the male HEI is not
significant in the model of ethnic civil war. This fits with the overall trend of a
weaker relationship between HEI and high levels of conflict, likely because rebels
may need a considerably larger motive to engage in such costly activity. This
result also further disproves my third hypothesis, as male HEI is not significant in
predicting ethnic civil war, but female HEI is significant. One important
consideration is the smaller size of the data set for males, as I was limited in scope
by the availability of surveys. It may also be unsound to compare male and
female estimates from different data sets, as they reflect a different cross-section
of countries. Further research into the relationship between female and male HEI
will be needed to better inform the accuracy of my third hypothesis.
Similar to the models of female HEI and conflict onset, new state and
noncontiguous state are consistently significant in Models 5-8. For countries in
the male dataset, being in the first two years of existence increases the odds of
civil conflict and civil war onset by 1692 and 156 times, respectively, and
increases the odds of ethnic civil conflict and ethnic civil war by 30492 and 2281
times, respectively. Being a noncontiguous state increases the odds of civil
conflict and civil war onset by 24 and 6.1 times, respectively, and increases the
odds of ethnic civil conflict and ethnic civil war by 61 and 7.6 times, respectively.
Again, the extreme results of the magnitude of new state are likely due to the size
of the sample, which may not be representative of all developing countries. Other
variables reaching significance in the models include GDP per capita for ethnic
and civil conflict and ethnic civil war, similar to the female models, and oil
producation per capita for all models. The number of peace years is found to be
significant for civil conflicts, but not for civil wars, whereas the percentage of
mountainous terrain is significant in the models of civil war but not civil conflict.
The number of peace years may be significant for civil conflict because of the
more frequent nature of conflicts in compariso to wars.
Additionally,
mountainous terrain may be significant for civil war but not for conflict because
only in large scale operations would hiding in the mountains be advantageous.
5. Conclusion
Building primarily on the work of Østby (2008), this study has
demonstrated that examining horizontal inequalities, especially in relation to
social factors such as education, is an important extension of the classic civil
conflict literature. In contrast to prominent studies that have found only
insignificant relationships between inequality, ethnic heterogeneity, and civil
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conflict, horizontal educational inequality was found to be marginally significant
in predicting civil conflict and strongly significant in predicting ethnic civil
conflict in this study. Furthermore, while Østby was able to establish a link
between female HEI and conflict, I was able to extend that relationship to male
HEI and higher levels of conflict, increasing the significance of the results.
There are several limitations to my study that I have discussed throughout
my paper. One of the biggest restrictions is the small sample size, as 44 countries
may not be representative of the population of developing countries for female
estimates, and 32 countries for male estimates are likely even less representative.
This could lead to skewed estimates in some of my models. The calculation of
HEI is also somewhat limiting, as it can only be constructed for country-years in
which a DHS survey has taken place, and values must be interpolated and
extrapolated from those years. A more accurate measure would be calculated
from data on each country-year, but that type of data is not currently available.
Promisingly, DHS surveys continue to expand their coverage, so future studies of
a similar nature could employ more years and more countries in their analyses.
Future extensions of this study could include other measures of HI
concerning economic, political, or other social factors. Establishing the links
between these measures and ethnic conflict would be worthwhile, especially
given some of the significant results found in this paper. Furthermore, exploring
the relationship between female and male indicators of HI for different socioeconomic factors would add to our understanding of the causes of civil conflict.
An analysis of the policy implications of these results, while outside of the scope
of this paper, would aid greatly in understanding the importance of HI and would
be an interesting complement to the empirical results of my study. Furthermore,
it would allow for these results to be applied towards actual policy-making that
could aid in reducing the prevalence of civil conflict in developing countries.
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APPENDIX A: Countries and DHS Surveys included in the analysis
Country
Albania
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Benin

Brazil
Burkina Faso

Cameroon

Central African Republic
Chad
Cote d’Ivoire
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Ethiopia
Gabon
Ghana

Guatemala

Guinea
India
Kazakhstan
Kenya

Kyrgyz Republic
Liberia
Malawi

Year
2008*
2000*
2006*
1996*
2001*
2006*
1991
1996
1993*
1998*
2003*
1991*
1998*
2004*
1994*
1996*
2004*
1994*
1998
2007*
2000*
2005*
2000*
1988
1993*
1998*
2003*
2008*
1987
1995
1998
1999*
2005*
1992
1998
1995
1999*
1989
1993*
1998*
2003*
2008*
1997
1986
2000*
2004*

Country
Mali

Moldova
Mozambique
Namibia
Nepal

Niger

Peru
Philippines

Republic of the Congo
Rwanda
Senegal

Sierra Leone
South Africa
Sri Lanka
Togo
Trinidad and Tobago
Turkey
Uganda

Uzbekistan
Vietnam
Zambia

Zimbabwe

Year
1987
1995*
2001*
2006*
2005*
1997*
1992
2000*
1987
1996
2001*
2006*
1992*
1998*
2006*
1991
2000
1993
1998
2003*
2008
2005*
1992*
1986
1992*
1997*
2005*
2008*
1998
1987
1988
1998*
1987
1993
1988
1995*
2000
1996
1997
2002
1992
1996*
2001*
2007*
1988
1994*
1999

* Survey years including both male and female data (otherwise female only)
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APPENDIX B: Geographic Distribution of Survey Countries

Female data only
Male and female data
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APPENDIX C: Covariance Tables (female and male data)
CPYRS WPYRS DEML ANOCL NWST RGCHG OILPCL LMTN NCON

Female HEI (FHEI)
GDP per capita (GPDPCL)
Population size (LPOPL)
Conflict Peace Years (CPYRS)
War Peace Years (WPYRS)
Democracy (DEML)
Anocracy (ANOCL)
New state (NWST)
Regime change (RGCHG)
Oil production (OILPCL)
Mountainous terrain (LMTN)
Noncontiguous state (NCON)

FHEI GDPPCL LPOPL
1.000
-0.213 1.000
0.215 -0.131
1.000
-0.142 0.126
-0.177
-0.203 0.131
-0.175
0.003 0.282
0.238
0.001 -0.117 -0.115
-0.075 0.101
-0.047
0.072 -0.144 -0.048
-0.201 0.698
-0.396
0.239 0.008
0.391
-0.094 0.017
0.452

CPYRS WPYRS DEML ANOCL NWST RGCHG OILPCL LMTN NCON

Male HEI (MHEI)
GDP per capita (GPDPCL)
Population size (LPOPL)
Conflict Peace Years (CPYRS)
War Peace Years (WPYRS)
Democracy (DEML)
Anocracy (ANOCL)
New state (NWST)
Regime change (RGCHG)
Oil production (OILPCL)
Mountainous terrain (LMTN)
Noncontiguous state (NCON)

MHEI GDPPCL LPOPL
1.000
-0.210 1.000
0.222 -0.401 1.000
0.019 0.160 -0.341
0.064 -0.002 -0.205
-0.189 0.012
0.053
0.031 0.029
0.048
-0.083 0.167 -0.061
0.085 -0.084 0.025
-0.188 0.806 -0.443
-0.075 0.007
0.410
-0.181 0.139
0.293

https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol8/iss1/10

1.000
0.690
0.088
-0.104
-0.072
0.018
0.148
-0.213
-0.209

1.000
0.644
-0.012
-0.015
-0.081
0.023
0.183
-0.221
-0.209

1.000
0.065
0.016
-0.104
0.043
0.116
-0.394
-0.295

1.000
-0.041
0.174
-0.119
0.078
0.079
-0.393
-0.309

1.000
-0.562
-0.005
-0.078
-0.030
0.057
0.225

1.000
-0.454
0.045
0.019
-0.134
-0.077
0.200

1.000
0.029
0.195
0.037
0.012
-0.172

1.000
0.027
0.179
0.108
0.052
-0.149

1.000
-0.045
-0.006
0.056
0.029

1.000
-0.050
0.001
0.054
0.057

1.000
-0.026
-0.068
-0.003

1.000
-0.015
-0.042
0.037

1.000
-0.254
-0.025

1.000
-0.186
0.002

1.000
0.189

1.000
0.255

1.000

1.000
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APPENDIX D: Descriptive Statistics (female and male data)
Variable (Female)

N

Mean

Std. dev.

Min.

Max.

Civil Conflict Onset

846

0.046

0.210

0

1

Civil War Onset

846

0.024

0.152

0

1

Ethnic Civil Conflict Onset

846

0.033

0.179

0

1

Ethnic Civil War Onset

846

0.015

0.123

0

1

Female HEI

846

0.285

0.224

0.000

0.800

GDP per capita

839

2.832

2.794

0.171

19.561

Population (ln)

839

9.338

1.277

6.781

13.886

Peace Years (Civil Conflict)

846

12.911

15.372

0

59

Peace Years (Civil War)

846

21.267

18.336

0

59

Democracy

834

0.308

0.462

0

1

Anocracy

834

0.415

0.493

0

1

New State

846

0.017

0.128

0

1

Regime Change

846

0.187

0.390

0

1

Oil Production per capita

839

0.634

2.193

0

16.407

Mountainous Terrain (ln)

846

1.915

1.484

0

4.313

Noncontiguous State

846

0.065

0.247

0

1

Variable (Male)

N

Mean

Std. dev.

Min.

Max.

Civil Conflict Onset

616

0.045

0.208

0

1

Civil War Onset

616

0.019

0.138

0

1

Ethnic Civil Conflict Onset

616

0.036

0.186

0

1

Ethnic Civil War Onset

616

0.013

0.113

0

1

Male HEI

616

0.249

0.182

0.144

0.749

GDP per capita

611

2.158

2.365

0.338

14.007

Population (ln)

611

9.117

0.941

6.781

11.337

Peace Years (Civil Conflict)

616

13.731

14.560

0

59

Peace Years (Civil War)

616

22.604

16.750

0

59

Democracy

609

0.200

0.401

0

1

Anocracy

609

0.452

0.498

0

1

New State

616

0.016

0.126

0

1

Regime Change

616

0.227

0.419

0

1

Oil Production per capita

611

0.631

2.349

0

16.407

Mountainous Terrain (ln)

616

1.667

1.446

0

4.313

Noncontiguous State

616

0.057

0.232

0

1
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